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Abstract 
The neo-liberal economic reforms and corresponding 
arrogance of the Nigerian governing class on the 
inviolability of market reforms depicts aspects of the 
Nigerian crises. The resultant social inequality among 
social groups because of the implementation of market 
reforms raises question on its purpose, relevance, 
and implications. The neo-liberal paradigm had been 
posed and foisted on the Nigerian economy by external 
agencies as panacea to its structural distortions and 
underdevelopment. The market reforms, however, 
have been pigeon-holed as retarding development and 
signposting social inequality. Social inequality reflects 
the social backlash of economic reforms; the lopsided 
sacrifices of the working people, urban poor, and peasants 
in relation to the affluence and profligate lifestyle of 
state officials and their allies, changing lifestyles and 
decline in the living conditions of affected social groups. 
The victims of market reforms question its purpose and 
insist on endogenous, pro-poor and pro-people based 
alternative economic and developmental frameworks. 
The political economy approach offers theoretical basis 
to examine the Nigerian economy, its social classes, and 
the ensuing social class struggles against market reforms 
and social inequality. This work poses specific questions 
to situate the interfaces of state, market reforms and 
social inequality in Nigeria. Who are the beneficiaries 
of economic reform programs? Who are the victims of 
social inequality? How do the victims respond to social 
inequality? How do economic reforms result in social 
inequality? How does the Nigerian state deal with the 
question of social inequality? How adequate are these 
measures? 
Key words:  Nigeria; Market reforms; Social 
inequality; Social backlash; Structural distortions; Neo-
liberal paradigm; Social classes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The nature of neo-liberal economic reforms and the 
arrogance of state actors on the inviolability of market 
reforms depict aspects of the Nigerian crises. The Nigerian 
state actors embraced the neo-liberal policy to economic 
management to alleviate the effect of the distortions that 
characterize the Nigerian economy. The Breton-Woods 
institutions externally defined these reform measures, but 
it led to social backlash that worsened social inequality 
among the social classes in Nigeria. 
The state’s responses to improve the economic status 
of the country and moderate social inequality through 
reform programs are perceived as political machinations 
of the governing class to further deplete the national 
wealth at the expense of the pauperized masses. The 
trend of social inequality gained currency in the global 
South including the Nigerian state despite the attempt of 
the state actors at improving the economy and mediating 
social inequality (Aigbokhan, 2008; Awe & Rufus, 
2012, p.1). The Nigerian oil boom of the 1970s made 
the economy mono-cultural, and it was the basis for new 
forms of social inequalities. Prior to the discovery of 
commercially based crude oil, the economy thrived on 
agricultural production. The old regions; west, mid-west, 
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east and north specialized in the production of cash crops 
for export. The agricultural sector was the main stay of 
the economy and highest foreign exchange earner. The 
advent of crude oil export, however, altered the structure 
of the economy. The oil sector substituted the agricultural 
sector as the linchpin of the economy and highest foreign 
exchange earner. The crude oil-based economy led to de-
emphasis on agricultural output, disappearance of huge 
farmlands and plantations, relocation of rural peasants to 
urban centres for white collar jobs, and the collapse of 
agro based industries in the regions. This changing nature 
of the economy increased social inequality as state actors 
shared oil money through large contracts to their wealthy 
political cronies who had influence on the state apparatus 
(Okoroafor, 2016, p.35). Consequently, social inequality 
became exacerbated between the urban and rural residents, 
political class and the middle class, governing class, and 
urban poor/ rural peasants because of the pillage of state 
resources, diversion of resources, implementation of anti-
people and anti-poor social and economic policies, the 
pursuit of policies that reduces the size and strength of the 
working and middle classes.   
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed 
the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on the 
economy as strict conditionality for loans and economic 
reforms (Mimiko, 1995). The SAP appeals to market 
orthodoxy, and it is characterized by trade liberalization, 
privatization, commercialization, inflow of foreign 
direct investment, (FDI), and deregulation. The 1988 
privatization and commercialization policies, which is 
a part of SAP, resulted in increased social gaps between 
the wealthy and poor due to the manipulation of the 
exercises and the diversion of funds accruing from the 
privatization exercise. Meanwhile, the National Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategies (NEEDS) program 
launched in 2003 failed to mediate social inequity, though 
it sought to actualize wealth creation, employment 
generation and poverty alleviation within the prisms of 
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism (Adeyemo 
et al., 2008, p.123; Idornigie, 2012, p.5). The (UNDP, 
2009) insists that the NEEDS program did not minimize 
social inequality since about 65% of the nation’s assets 
were distributed among 20% of its population. This work 
argues that the economic reform measures in Nigeria, 
particularly SAP, rather than reviving the economy, 
worsened economic crisis as shown in the increasing 
level of unemployment rate, increasing level of unskilled 
labour and growing poverty (Baden, 1997; Obadan, 2003; 
Umezurike, 2012, p.13). These economic indices deepen 
social inequality as shown in the increasing disparity 
between the poor working people, urban poor, peasants, 
and the rich governing class. 
The international financial institutions, however, 
argued that the underdevelopment of the third world 
economies was the result of protectionist policy 
(economic nationalism), and the rejection of the free 
market policies (the reluctance to open borders and end 
high import duties, tariff). The international financial 
lenders insisted that the developing countries recorded 
increasing poverty and social inequality due to the 
failure to implement  market reforms (Adeyemo, Salami, 
& Olu-Adeyemi, 2008, p.121; Egharevba, 2008, p.65). 
This argument is vitiated by the findings in the latter part 
of the work. 
The increasing social inequality raises question on the 
purpose, relevance, and consequences of market reforms 
for Nigeria’s political economy. The harsh impacts of 
neo-liberal reforms on vulnerable social classes had 
emboldened these groups to engage it’s philosophical and 
ideological premises and question its capacity to foster 
development. This research describes social inequality 
as the deterioration of living conditions of the working 
people, urban poor, and peasants in contradistinction to 
the status of the political class due to anti-people, socially 
harsh economic policies. The latter part of this work 
interrogates the social inequalities foisted by market 
reforms, the responses of affected social groups to their 
social conditions, the conscious attempt of state actors to 
contain social dissent occasioned by the harsh impacts of 
neo-liberal reforms, the adequacy of state led measures to 
mediate social inequality. 
From the foregoing, certain questions are posed to 
examine the linkage of social inequality and economic 
reforms in Nigeria. Who are the economic reforms meant 
for? How do economic reforms create social inequality? 
Who are the victims of social inequality? How do the 
victims respond to social inequality? How is the state 
engaging social inequality? How adequate is the state 
response? These issues aid to examine the nexus of the 
state, market reforms and social inequality in the latter 
part of the work. 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Political Economy is the sum-total of relations of 
production, which is hinged on the economic structure of 
the society. This approach emphasizes the significance 
and import of the mode of production, ownership of the 
means of production and social relations for economic 
and political choices. It critiques the capitalist mode of 
production, identifies resultant social class struggles 
amidst the domination and exploitation that underlie 
social relations. The political economic theory argues that 
the capitalist state is organized to reproduce the conditions 
of capitalism; this state, it asserts, is not ideologically 
neutral since it reflects and responds to the class interests 
of the exploiter class. The social relations imposed 
by the capitalist state, therefore, defines the nature of 
social classes that emerges and the resultant social class 
struggles (Ake, 1981, p.85; Aina, 1986, p.4).  
The regime of neo-liberalism led to the out-pricing 
and out-doing of the weak socio-economic classes 
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in the economic and social spaces. The regimes of 
liberalization, commercialization and privatization led 
to the distancing of the state from the working class, 
urban poor and rural peasants; amid the contradictions 
occasioned by the ascendancy of the market, decline 
of the state, and the resultant vulnerability of the weak 
social classes to the disruptions and distortions that are 
tied to market reforms. 
The pursuit of market reforms in the Nigerian economy 
increased social gaps, heightened material poverty, led to 
the emasculation of the middle class, and the alienation 
of the mass of people from the state and its apparatuses. 
The implementation of market policy in Nigeria resulted 
in new social forces and struggles that are informed by the 
harsh, anti-people and anti-poor impacts of state policies 
(Seteolu, 2017a, p.49; Seteolu, 2017b, pp.39-40). 
This work adopts the political economy approach 
to interrogate the class motive behind state policies, 
the contradictions created by the state policies, and the 
ensuing social class struggles against the state actions that 
deepen social inequalities. This approach assumes that the 
policies emanating from the state are rooted in social class 
interests. In other words, these policies will likely result 
in contrasting outcomes for state officials, working class, 
middle class, urban poor, and peasants. The assumption 
of political economy theory on the class character of the 
state aids this work to interpret the class goals behind 
state policies. This research posits that the Nigerian state, 
is not unbiased in the struggle for resources. This state is 
an instrument of the dominant fractions of the governing 
class to foster and sustain their class goals. 
This work focuses on inter class struggles since the 
class interests of the dominant and dominated classes 
are often at conflict. These struggles are sometimes, 
subtle, but quite often there are visible differences on the 
exercise of political power and the control of economic 
resources. The social inequality question in Nigeria is 
hinged on social class differentiations, the class character 
of state social policies, and the responses of affected 
social classes to the alienating and exploiting outcomes of 
social policies. The state in Nigeria, sometimes, pursues 
measures to mediate the social back lash of state actions 
thereby creating the façade of a state that is caring, 
benevolent and socially responsive.
2. THE STATE, MARKET REFORMS AND 
SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN NIGERIA
Post-independence, the Nigerian economy was predicated 
on the agricultural sector. This sector accommodated 
about two-third of the population in the low-income 
class (Canagarajah, Nwgafon, & Thomas, 1997). Since 
the larger percentage of the socio-economic classes were 
involved in rural farming, the nationalists that assumed 
political power became economic moguls and the 
national bourgeois class. This class became increasingly 
acquisitive and it sustained conspiratorial relationship 
with the former colonial power to plunder the economy 
for personal and social class gains. The masses belief of 
the new political class as political messiah emboldened 
this class to primitively accumulate resources. The state 
power became an instrument to enrich the political class 
since the exercise of political power in equated access to 
the national treasury. The unbridled gains appropriated by 
the political class did not attract so much resistance in the 
initial period of political independence because of the low 
level of consciousness of urban poor and rural peasants. 
The control of state power and the accompanying 
primitive accumulation of resources deepened social 
Inequality as two different extremes; the few rich and the 
mass poor at the other end (UNDP, 2009, p. 21).  
The oil-based economy spurred ‘rentier mentality’ in 
the political class amid the de-emphasis on agricultural 
output. The agricultural sector output declined in 2006-
2010 except for slight increases in 2011 and 2013 (see 
Table 1). The primitive accumulation of the political class 
thrived amidst the economic crisis of the early 80s and its 
social fallouts. The poverty head count increased in 1980 
from 27.2% to 46.3% in 1985, and there was a slight drop 
to 42.7% in 1992 (see Table 2). 
Table 1
Agricultural Output From 2006 to 2010
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agricultural sector 7.40 7.20 6.30 5.90 5.60 5.90 4.0 4.15
Source: Nigeria Millennium Development Goals Report, 2013. 
The poverty rate in 1980 of 27.2% increased to 
incredibly high level of 69.0% in 2010. The population 
in poverty in 1980 of 18.1% increased to 112.47% in 
2010. The population in poverty increased in 1985 from 
34.73% to 39.07% in 1992 following the introduction of 
the Structural Adjustment Program, SAP (see Table 2). 
The SAP policy led to the depreciation of exchange rates, 
which negatively affected the real wages of workers and 
the living conditions of the urban poor and rural peasants. 
The exchange rate of the Naira to Dollar increased in 1986 
from N1/$1 to N3.2/$1 (Thomas & Canagarajah, 2002). 
This article posits that market reforms are mere rhetoric 
to hide the class objectives of neo-liberal economic 
policies and the pretence to socially responsive state. The 
withdrawal of the Nigerian state from social provisioning, 
the increasing loss of jobs and collapse of industries 
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Table 2 
Poverty Head Count From 1980- 2010 Unit to Million
Year Poverty rate Total populationestimate
Population in
poverty
1980 27.2 65.0 18.1
1985 46.3 75.0 34.73
1992 42.7 91.5 39.07
1996 65.6 102.3 67.11
2004 54.4 126.3 68.70
2010 69.0 163 112.47
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2010.
because of liberalization, the controversial sale of publicly 
owned enterprises to cronies of state officials, increase in 
poverty rate and population in poverty as shown in Table 
2 points at some of the social fallouts of market reforms. 
The social consequences of market reforms heightened 
social inequalities as depicted by the falling standard of 
living of workers and the urban residents as a result of 
job losses, under employment, casualization, increasing 
price level, declining real income; increasing rural urban 
migration as a result of the neglect and under development 
of the rural sectors; and less affordable social services as a 
result of the commercialization and privatization of public 
enterprises. 
The social implications of market reforms question 
the legitimacy of the Nigerian state amid the arrogance of 
state actors and official theorists of neo-liberal policy on 
the sanctity of market reforms. The withdrawal of the state 
from social provisioning and the ascendancy of the market 
creates doubt on the relevance and impacts of the state on 
the vulnerable social classes. The affected social groups 
kept distance from the state and its actors. The perception 
of distanced state and withdrawal from its structures and 
apparatuses de-legitimizes the state. The governing class 
also denied there are alternatives to neo-liberal policy 
albeit its shortcomings (Adeyemo & Olu-Adeyemi, 2008, 
p.128). The decreasing capacity of the Nigerian state to 
provide social services raises the question on its relevance 
and purpose. The legitimacy deficit of the Nigerian state 
heightens with the social fallout of market reforms. The 
non-state actors such as community-based organizations 
and rural based organizations provide social services to 
bridge the deficit occasioned by the withdrawal of the 
state. The non-state actors are somewhat emerging as 
alternatives to state structures and attracting allegiance. 
Table 3
Statistics of Population Employed and Unemployed
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population figures 140,431,790 144,925,607 149,563,227 154,349,250 159,288,426 164,385,656
Economically active 78,922,666 81,448,191 84,054,533 86,744,278 89,520,095 92,384,738 
Labour force 57,455,701 59,294,283 61,191,700 63,149,835 65,170,629 67,256,090 
Employed 50,388,650 51,763,909 52,074,137 50,709,317 51,224,115 51,181,884 
Unemployed 7,067,051 7,530,374 9,117,563 12,440,517 13,946,515 16,074,205 
Newly unemployed 463,323 1,587,189 3,322,954 1,505,997 2,127,691 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics: Annual Socio-Economic Report 2011.
The post SAP adjustment reforms of the Obasanjo 
civilian administration did not mediate the social fallout of 
neo-liberal policy. The sizes of the unemployed and newly 
unemployed increased under the regime of post SAP (see 
Table 3). In response to the adverse consequences of neo-
liberal reforms, the governing class implemented ‘poverty 
alleviation programs’ to mediate the negative implications 
of neo-liberal reforms. The Subsidy Reinvestment and 
Empowerment Program, SUREP; youth Empowerment 
in Agriculture, YEA; youth Enterprise with Innovation 
in  Nigeria ,  YouWIN; and Borno Empowerment 
Scheme, BOYES are responses of the Obasanjo and 
Jonathan administrations to grow poverty, increasing 
unemployment and social inequality. The most ambitious 
poverty alleviation program since 1999 is the National 
Social Investment Program (N-SIP). N-SIP is the initiative 
of the Buhari administration meant to reduce poverty 
and improve livelihoods of vulnerable groups such as 
the unemployed youths, women and children. Over 
1.6 million Nigerians through the four components of 
N-SIP; N-Power, National Home Grown School Feeding 
Program, Conditional Cash Transfer, and Government 
Enterprise and Empowerment Program have prospects 
of benefitting (see https://www.premiumtimesng.
com/.../232756-osinbajo-orders-nigerian-govt-job-
porta...).
This research insists it is rather early to assess the 
overall impact of the N-SIP; the program has not had 
significant impact on the worrisome level of youth 
unemployment in Nigeria. To the National Bureau of 
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Statistics, out of a total youth labour force population 
of 40.74 million (representing 50.2% of total labour 
force in Nigeria of 81.15 million), a total of 19.3 million 
were either unemployed or underemployed in Q4 2016 
(Unemployment and Underemployment Report Q4 
2016, National Bureau of Statistics, June 2017) while 
the haunting sceptre of gross social inequality remains 
threatening. According to Oxfam International, 
…the combined wealth of Nigeria’s five richest men - $29.9 
billion - could end extreme poverty at a national level yet 5 
million face hunger. More than 112 million people are living in 
poverty in Nigeria, yet the country’s richest man would have 
to spend $1 million a day for 42 years to exhaust his fortune. 
(Nigeria; Extreme Inequality in Numbers, Oxfam International, 
May 2017). 
The report also points out that what the richest man in 
Nigeria can earn from his money in a year is sufficient to 
lift 2 million people from poverty.
The privatization component of neo-liberal reforms 
has social and economic implications for the working 
people. The promulgation of Decree No 25 of 1988 by the 
Babangida administration signalled the implementation 
of privatization and commercialization as recurring 
event in the Nigerian economy (Ikechukwu, 2013, p.1). 
The governing class insisted on the privatization of 
public enterprises albeit the series of strikes and counter-
strikes of organized labour. The Obasanjo administration 
unbundled the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, 
PHCN, into about 18 companies for power generation, 
transmission, distribution; and it privatized about 
116 enterprises within seven years (Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, 2006). The unbundling of PHCN led to the 
disengagement of workers thereby raising the level of 
discontent of the working people and increased social 
inequality as a result of the loss of jobs by hitherto 
employed workers, declining social living conditions, 
and decline in the purchasing power of the retrenched 
workers. The National Union of Electricity Employees, 
NUEE, raised the fear of retrenchment as fallout of 
the privatization of the PHCN. The massive job losses 
occasioned by the liberalization component of neo-
liberal reforms elicited robust intellectual and pragmatic 
responses of organized labour. It organized seminars, 
workshops, workers education, media campaigns, protests, 
rallies and strikes to exert pressure on the governing class 
to rethink the policy of market reforms.
The state officials and the protagonists of privatization 
expected that the unbundling of PHCN would mediate 
the problems of generation, transmission, and distribution 
of electricity. The companies are, however, enmeshed in 
financial crisis that compelled bail out by the Nigerian 
government. Critics of the exercise including the 
organized labour question the propriety of bail out for 
privately owned businesses. The unbundled companies, 
in some instances, were bought by private investors and 
cronies of state actors that lacked the expertise to manage 
the firms. The problems of distribution and transmission 
that characterized the power sector before the privatization 
exercise continues albeit new owners. In the light of these 
problems, the Buhari administration plan to resell the 
troubled companies to new investors. There are fears that 
the resale will be bogged by the politics that characterized 
the previous exercise. The character of Nigeria’s political 
economy and the nature of the political class constitute 
the bases for the fears. 
The implementation of de-subsidization component 
of neo-liberal reforms resulted in the gradual withdrawal 
of subsidies and its replacement by the invisible hands 
of the market as determinants of prices. The Obasanjo 
administration increased pump price due to de-
subsidization to 26 Naira on January 1, 2002 and 40 naira 
on June 23, 2003. It increased pump price in May 2007 
from 40 Naira to 70 Naira. The resultant protests by the 
organized trade unions and civil society organizations led 
the Yar’ Adua administration to review the pump price 
to 65 Naira (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2011), but 
the Jonathan administration in January 2012 increased 
the pump price through the Petroleum Product Pricing 
Regulatory Agency, PPPRA from 65 Naira to 141 Naira 
per litre. The masses reasoned that, this neo-liberal de-
subsidization policy in pump price merely serves to 
increase the available “funds to be looted by the political 
class, impoverish the poor, and further widening the 
existing gap between the contradicting classes” (Aje & 
Chidozie, 2016, p.160). Hence the massive protests by the 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Trade Union Congress 
(TUC), National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Workers Union (NUPENG), Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and 
civil society organizations against the perceived anti-
people pricing of petroleum products. The protagonists 
of subsidy removal, however, refer to corrupt practices 
that characterize the subsidy regime. The economics of 
popular welfare and the misuse of state resources by state 
officials’ pigeon hole this argument (Seteolu, 2015, p.570).
This work argues that the country’s oil wealth did 
not translate into improved social conditions for the 
mass of people. The oil sector is characterized by 
corruption and oil theft amid the relentless pursuit of 
power, patronage, and private economic benefits by 
the governing class. More so, perversions and abuse of 
power characterize the fuel subsidy regime. The safety 
nets created to cushion the social consequences of 
recurring oil price adjustments became politicized amid 
the recurring transfer of social cost of the subsidy to the 
mass of people. This work insists that the transfer of 
social cost of the subsidy is anti-people, and it ignores 
the social imperative in the trajectories of development 
(Ibid., pp.571-572). The recurring fuel price adjustments 
often reflect on the domestic price level and the living 
conditions of the urban and rural residents. The prices 
of transport fares, foodstuffs, housing rent, tuition fees 
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of pupils et cetera are often adjusted to reflect the prices 
of petroleum products. The recurring price adjustments 
raise a question on the raison d’être of the state. The 
concrete social conditions are foisted by neo-liberal 
reforms of impoverishes and alienate the weak social 
groups from state structures and state officials thus 
raising doubt about the welfare essence of the state. The 
political class flaunts affluence and riches and it expects 
the victims of market reforms to make sacrifices. This 
plea for sacrifice has become a cliché in the Nigerian 
society to justify economic reforms and suggest the 
prospects of economic renewal because of adjustments 
in the economy. The repeated sacrifices of the working 
people, urban poor, intellectual class, middle class, 
students, artisans, and peasants have been exploited to 
sustain exploitation and domination.
CONCLUSION
The work found that the workers, urban residents, and 
other vulnerable social groups suffer deprivations because 
of the implementation of market reforms. It relied on 
data to demonstrate the deteriorations in the economic 
and social living conditions of workers and other social 
categories due to the regimes of privatization, de-
subsidization, casualization et cetera. Social inequality 
gaps in Nigeria repudiate the claims of the governing 
class of the gains of market reforms. The governing class 
claims the freeing of resources for economic growth 
due to privatization and de-subsidization policies, the 
right pricing of exchange rate, the pursuit of balance 
of payment equilibrium, and the promotion of private 
sector led economic growth. The Nigerian economy still 
commits huge resources to the service of external debts 
at a social cost. The privatization exercise was bogged by 
the absence of transparency, alleged diversion of proceeds 
from the sale of public enterprises, the hijack of privatized 
companies by the cronies of state managers, and the 
cannibalization of some of the privatized companies 
by the new owners. The growth of the private sector is 
hindered by the high interest rate, a high exchange rate, 
increasing cost of energy, and the policy of liberalization 
that makes local firms uncompetitive against the Chinese 
and Western based firms. The abysmally low industrial 
capacity utilization, low manning level, closure of 
factories especially in the textile industry points to the 
de-industrialization outcome of adjustment reforms in 
Nigeria. The indigenous private sector will not likely 
thrive in the light of the factors discussed earlier. The 
Nigerian economy relies on foreign direct investment, to a 
significant extent, for capital formation; and state policies 
stultify local capital.
This research exploited the political economy 
approach to examine the interfaces of the state, market 
reforms and social inequality. It found that the economic 
reforms since SAP did not benefit the workers and the 
poor. Protests and disapproval of market reforms led to 
palliatives to mediate the social fallout. The measures 
are, however, inadequate to offset increasing social 
inequality in Nigeria. 
The work found that the market reforms are steeped 
in western capitalist ideas, which fail to account for the 
country’s historical specificity. It argues for alternative 
economic and developmental ideas that address the 
country’s historical realities and proffer pro-poor, pro-
people social policies to deal with social inequalities. 
It argues for social policies that emphasise human 
imperatives. This shift will assist to redeem the purpose 
of the state and restore its legitimacy. Development 
trajectories must abandon market fetishism and create 
socially responsive state; the raison d’être of the state will 
thus be served.
REFERENCES 
Adeyemo, D., Salami, A., & Olu-Adeyemi, L. (2008). An 
appraisal of economic reforms in Nigeria. Contemporary 
Management Research, 4(2), 119-136.
Aje, O., & Felix, C. (2016). The logic and illogic of the “doctrine 
of change” in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. International 
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews, 6(2), 
156-163. 
Aigbokhan, B. (2008). Growth, inequality and poverty in 
Nigeria. Economic Commission for Africa, Discussion 
Paper, ACGC/ MPAMS, No.3.
Awe, A., & Rufus, O. (2012). Determinants of income 
distribution in the Nigerian economy, 1977-2007. 
International Business and Management, 5(1), 126-137.
Baden, S. (1997). Economic reform and poverty: A gender 
analysis. Report Prepared for the Gender Equality Unit, 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) Report No.50.
Bureau of Public Enterprises. (2006). Federal Government of 
Nigeria
Canagarajah, S., Ngwafon, J., & Thomas, S. (1997). Evolution 
of poverty and welfare in Nigeria. Policy Research Working 
Paper No.1715.
Chilcote, H, R. (2000). Comparative inquiry in politics and 
political economy: Theories and issues. University of 
California: Westview Press. 
Centre for Public Policy Alternatives. (2011). Nigeria: Fuel 
Subsidy .  A Desktop Study by the CPPA. Retrieved 
November from http://cpparesearch.org/documents  
Ethridge, M., & Handelman, H. (2009). Politics in a changing 
world: A comparative introduction into political science. 
Wordsworth: Centage Learning.
Egharevba, M. E. (2008). Neo-liberal socio-economic policy and 
human development in the informal sector of Lagos state. 
Being a Doctoral Thesis Submitted to the Department of 
Sociology, Covenant University.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The State, Market Reforms and Social Inequality 
in Nigeria: A Political Economy Interpretation
30
Gi lp in ,  R .  ( 2001 ) .  Globa l  po l i t i ca l  e conomy:  The 
international economic order. Princeton University 
Press: New-Jersey.
Handelman, H. (2006).  The challenge of  third world 
development. New-Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.
Idornigie, P. (2012). Privatization and commercialization of 
public enterprises in Nigeria. A Paper Presented at the 
National Conference on Law and Economic Transformation 
in Nigeria, Faculty of Law, Obafemi Awolowo University, 
Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
Ikechuckwu, I. (2013). Privatization of public enterprises in 
Nigeria. Developing Countries, 3(3), 1-7.
James, M., & Dietz, A. (2004). The process of economic 
development. London: Routledge.
Jones, G., & Claeys, G. (2011). The Cambridge history of 
nineteenth-century political thought. London: Cambridge 
University Press.
Mimiko, N. (1995). Crises and contradictions in Nigeria’s 
democratisation programme, 1986-1993. Akure: Stebak 
Printers.
Obadan M. I. (2003). National development planning and 
budgeting in Nigeria: Some pertinent issues. Lagos: 
Broadway Press Limited.
Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osaafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria’s 
economic reforms: Progress and challenges. Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution.
Okorie, C. (2014). A survey of public service reforms in Nigeria, 
1999-2013. International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 4(10), 265-275.
Okoroafor, E. (2016). Public sector reforms in Nigeria: 
Implications for the public sector and budgeting system. 
International Journal of Developing and Emerging 
Economies, 4(1), 34-49.
Stephen, B. (2011). The economic implications of monetization 
policy in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Sustainable 
Development, 2(3)
Seteolu, D. (2015). The state, subsidy question and social 
class struggles. In Y. Salami et al. (Eds.), Nationalism and 
economic justice in Nigeria (pp.566, 568-570). Ile Ife: 
Obafemi Awolowo Press. 
Thomas, S., & Canagarajah, S. (2002). Poverty in a wealthy 
economy: The case of Nigeria (pp.1-37). International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper.
UNDP. (2009). Human development report Nigeria (2008-2009): 
Achieving growth with equity. Retrieved from http://hdr.
undp.org/sites/default/files/nhdr_nigeria_2008-2009.pdf
